Loving Lessons: White Supremacy, Loving v. Virginia, and Disproportionality in the Child Welfare System by Hill, Leah A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 6 Article 8 
2018 
Loving Lessons: White Supremacy, Loving v. Virginia, and 
Disproportionality in the Child Welfare System 
Leah A. Hill 
FordhamUniversity School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law 
Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leah A. Hill, Loving Lessons: White Supremacy, Loving v. Virginia, and Disproportionality in the Child 
Welfare System, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 2727 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss6/8 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2727 
LOVING LESSONS:  WHITE SUPREMACY, 
LOVING V. VIRGINIA, AND 
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM 
Leah A. Hill* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article looks back at the antimiscegenation laws that were at the 
center of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia1 to reveal 
what they teach us about the current overrepresentation of black children in 
the American child welfare system.2  It is widely accepted that 
antimiscegenation laws worked to preserve white supremacy—particularly, 
the superiority of white people to blacks3—but these laws also worked to 
forestall the creation of interracial families.4  Moreover, laws banning 
interracial marriage were said to prevent children from suffering harm caused 
by race mixing.5  Thus, these laws were viewed by supporters as preventing 
child abuse.6  By focusing on the harm—or “damage”7—of being biracial, 
these laws foreshadowed the pervasive disproportionality in the child welfare 
system today. 
 
*  Associate Dean for Experiential Education and Clinical Associate Professor, Fordham 
University School of Law.  I want to extend my sincere thanks to Sloane Lewis, my research 
assistant.  Thanks also to Robin A. Lenhardt, Kimani Paul-Emile, and Tanya K. Hernández, 
as well as the editors of the Fordham Law Review, for the opportunity to reflect on the legacy 
of the landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia at the Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving 
v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality held at Fordham University School 
of Law on November 2–3, 2017.  For an overview of the Symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt, 
Tanya K. Hernández & Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword:  Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and 
the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018). 
 
 1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2. For recent data on the overrepresentation of black children in the child welfare system, 
see CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD 
WELFARE (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B4XW-PH38]. 
 3. See Christopher R. Leslie, Justice Alito’s Dissent in Loving v. Virginia, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1563, 1571 (2014); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding:  Same-Sex Marriage and 
the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 99–101 (1993). 
 4. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 1605; Trosino, supra note 3, at 101–02. 
 5. See Oral Argument at 1:26:19–:26:40, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/395 [https://perma.cc/9LCP-BZ8C]. 
 6. See id.; Trosino, supra note 3, at 102. 
 7. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:32–:26:40. 
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While there is widespread agreement that antimiscegenation laws 
reinforced white superiority over blacks, the claim that these laws were 
designed to prevent child abuse is less apparent in scholarship.8  This Article 
explores one argument put forth by the state of Virginia in support of its ban 
on interracial marriage—that the prohibition against interracial marriage was 
a valid exercise of state power to protect children from damage that would 
result from intermarriage between blacks and whites.9  The state’s argument 
in Loving focused on the challenges that biracial children would face while 
navigating the racist context of the United States at the time.10  Underneath 
Virginia’s veiled concern for the well-being of biracial children was a more 
insidious claim:  children of black and white unions would be harmed by 
exposure to black family norms.11 
The persistent overrepresentation of black children in the child welfare 
system provides an opportunity to examine how racist attitudes about black 
family norms continue to influence family law.12  There is already an 
established body of literature pointing to the role of bias in perpetuating racial 
disproportionality in the child welfare system.13  This Article argues that 
child-abuse reporting laws—and particularly, mandates focused on reporting 
and investigating child neglect—invite decision makers to use implicit 
attitudes to evaluate black parents.  In doing so, these decision makers 
summon the ghosts of white supremacists’ ideas about preventing child 
abuse, the very same ideas that informed arguments in support of Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation laws that were struck down in Loving. 
Part I of this Article introduces a brief discussion of the history of 
antimiscegenation laws and, specifically, their prevalence in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia during the 1950s.  Next, Part II sets forth a short 
commentary about the Lovings’ triumph over antimiscegenation.  Part III 
then details the Lovings’ judicial hurdles against the state, which argued that 
its antimiscegenation laws were enacted, in part, to prevent child abuse and 
thus served legitimate state interests.  Part IV argues that the remnants of the 
 
 8. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 1605–07. 
 9. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:19–:26:40; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 
(1950 & Supp. 1960) (repealed 1968). 
 10. See Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:19–:26:40; see also id. at 1:27:03–:27:17, 
1:27:54–:28:06. 
 11. The opinion denying the Lovings’ motion to vacate their conviction, written by Judge 
Leon Bazile, had no such pretense. Loving v. Commonwealth (Va. Cir. Ct. Caroline Cty. Jan. 
22, 1965).  Judge Bazile opined that the legislature’s decision to enact antimiscegenation laws 
was based upon “wisdom and the moral development of both races.” Id.  He referred to 
marriages between blacks and whites as “unnatural alliances” and ultimately declared: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed 
them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with his arrangement there 
would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he separated the races shows 
that he did not intend for the races to mix. 
Id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting Judge Bazile). 
 12. See generally Sonia M. Gipson Rankin, Black Kinship Circles in the 21st Century:  
Survey of Recent Child Welfare Reforms and How It Impacts Black Kinship Care Families, 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2013, at 1; Zanita E. Fenton, Note, In a World Not 
Their Own:  The Adoption of Black Children, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 39 (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2. 
2018] LOVING LESSONS:  THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 2729 
white supremacist ideology at the center of Loving appear in our modern 
child welfare system, which has long been plagued by disproportionate 
representation of black children and families.  Finally, Part V builds on this 
discussion and contends that the prevalence of racial disproportionality in the 
current child welfare system is the product of front-end implicit bias, a view 
supported by extensive research on decision-making and behavioral conduct.  
It argues that current child welfare management and investigatory practices 
allow implicit bias to sneak in at the front end of such practices, thereby 
providing gateways to disproportionality. 
I.  WHITE SUPREMACY AND ANTIMISCEGENATION LAWS 
Laws prohibiting interracial marriage in the United States date back to 
colonial times, when the first of such laws banned white women from 
marrying slaves.14  By the time Mildred and Richard Loving were married in 
1958, more than half of the states had enacted laws prohibiting 
miscegenation.15  These laws worked primarily to promote and preserve 
white supremacy; particularly, the superiority of the white race when 
compared to that of blacks.16  Although laws barring whites from marrying 
nonwhites varied from state to state, they all had one consistent provision:  
whites were prohibited from marrying blacks.17  It is not surprising that when 
the Lovings were married in 1958, interracial relationships were rare, 
especially between blacks and whites.18  Significantly, interracial relations 
between white men and black women were almost nonexistent.19 
 
 14. See generally Byron Curti Martyn, Racism in The United States:  A History of the 
Anti-Miscegenation Legislation and Litigation (May 19, 1979) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Southern California) (on file with the University of Southern 
California Digital Library); see also 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND:  PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND:  JANUARY 1637/8—SEPTEMBER 1664, at 533 
(William Hand Browne ed., 1883); Carter G. Woodson, The Beginnings of the Miscegenation 
of the Whites and Blacks, 3 J. NEGRO HIST. 335, 339–40 (1918); Tom Head, Interracial 
Marriage Laws History & Timeline, THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/interracial-marriage-laws-721611 [https://perma.cc/A89A-
U8E5]. 
 15. James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26, 
26–31 (1951); see also Trosino, supra note 3, at 98. 
 16. Browning, supra note 15, at 33–35; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:  
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 
1647, 1656–58 (2005) (arguing that following emancipation, states permitted and encouraged 
former slaves to marry in order to maintain control over blacks on the one hand, but prohibited 
interracial marriage in order to maintain white dominance in the social hierarchy on the other); 
see also Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23–25 (Cal. 1948) (rejecting the state’s justification 
that its miscegenation statute “prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races 
whose members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians”). 
 17. Browning, supra note 15, at 31. 
 18. Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving 
v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/ 
intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/C5F5-KDND]. 
 19. Id. 
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The antimiscegenation statutes at the center of the Loving case were blunt 
in condemning marriage between blacks and whites.20  The law held that any 
white person who married a “colored person” and any colored person who 
married a white person would be guilty of a felony punishable by up to five 
years in prison.21  On the one hand, a person was defined as “white” if he had 
“no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian.”22  On the other hand, 
one was defined as a “colored person” if he had any “ascertainable . . . Negro 
blood.”23  Hence, white supremacist ideals of white purity and black taint 
were written into the statute.24  Any marriage in violation of Virginia’s 
prohibition against interracial marriage was deemed void.25  Interracial 
couples who left the state to marry were barred from returning as husband 
and wife and faced arrest if they did.26 
II.  LOVING TRIUMPH 
The Lovings’ story is one of triumph over the hate that permeated life in 
the 1950s.  They were married at the height of the Jim Crow era, when laws 
barring interracial marriage were part of the broader legacy of legalized 
racism and segregation born out of white supremacist ideology.27  Blacks and 
whites lived in separate worlds under Jim Crow and rarely interacted as 
equals.28  What was unique about Richard and Mildred Loving is that they 
did not grow up in a segregated community.29  They were raised in Caroline 
County, Virginia, a small and rural community that “had so many multiracial 
residents of white, black and Native American heritage that during 
segregation, their children all attended the county’s all-black high school.”30  
Caroline County was described as a place where race relations among whites 
 
 20. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1950 & Supp. 1960) (repealed 1968) (“It shall 
hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a 
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian.”). 
 21. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1950) (repealed 1968). 
 22. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (emphasis added).  An exception was made for white people 
who were otherwise pure but had “one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian.” 
Id. 
 23. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1950 & Supp. 1964) (repealed 1968). 
 24. See Trosino, supra note 3, at 102. 
 25. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1950) (repealed 1968). 
 26. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1950) (repealed 1968). 
 27. See ANDREW L. BARLOW, BETWEEN FEAR AND HOPE:  GLOBALIZATION AND RACE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 48 (2003) (“Jim Crow consciousness was white supremacist, in which the 
assertion of genetic and moral superiority was necessary to bolster an otherwise unclear claim 
to racial privilege.”). 
 28. ANDREW MCNEILL CANADY, WILLIS DUKE WEATHERFORD:  RACE, RELIGION, AND 
REFORM IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 75 (2016) (“In large part, the two races lived in separate 
worlds, and what little interaction did occur took place as whites employed black servants and 
farmworkers.”). 
 29. Carol Morello, Virginia’s Caroline County, ‘Symbolic of Main Street USA,’ WASH. 
POST (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginias-caroline-county-
symbolic-of-main-street-usa/2012/01/26/gIQAKH0z2Q_story.html [https://perma.cc/R4LH-
PAQ8]. 
 30. Id. 
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and blacks were generally good.31  Interracial marriage or relation was not 
uncommon in this area, and many in the farming community went to bat for 
the Lovings.32  Mildred and Richard thus did not grow up in the separate, 
isolated worlds common for blacks and whites during that time.  Having lived 
side by side, the Lovings had a shared experience, which presumably led to 
the kind of mutual respect and comfort upon which they built their 
relationship.33 
III.  FEAR OF THE BLACK FAMILY:  PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE 
The Lovings’ journey to the U.S. Supreme Court began when they left 
Caroline County and were married in Washington, D.C.34  Following their 
marriage, the couple returned to Caroline County to live and start a family.35  
Not long after their return, they were arrested for attempting to evade 
Virginia’s prohibition against interracial marriage by leaving the state to 
marry and returning there to live as husband and wife.36  The two ultimately 
pled guilty and were each sentenced to one year in jail.37  Their sentences 
were suspended on the condition that they leave Virginia and not return 
together as man and wife for twenty-five years.38  After failed attempts to 
reverse their convictions in state court, the Lovings challenged the 
constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute as violative of the 
 
 31. Simeon Booker, The Couple That Rocked Courts:  Lovings’ Fight Brought Supreme 
Court Decision Against Miscegenation Laws, EBONY MAG., Sept. 1967, at 79 (“Reporters 
dispatched to [Caroline County] found few individuals who would discuss the case.  ‘We have 
a community of our own,’ explained a prominent Caroline County leader.  ‘Our mores apply 
only here.  We’ve done more integrating than in any other part of the U.S.’”). 
 32. See id. 
 33. A New York Times review of a documentary film featuring the Lovings describes their 
undeniable connection with one another: 
The improbably named Lovings, Mildred and Richard, make a compelling couple, 
and not just because she is half-black, half-Native American and he is good ol’ boy 
white.  In a rich collection of 16-millimeter film, old news clips and still 
photographs, the Lovings don’t look like two people caught up in a cause, they seem 
like two people caught up in each other. 
Alessandra Stanley, Scenes from a Marriage that Segregationists Tried to Break Up, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/arts/television/the-loving-story-
an-hbo-documentary.html [https://perma.cc/3MK9-9XTH].  The review also references 
quotes from interviews with the Lovings, which were featured in the film.  In one scene, 
Richard Loving describes the experience of growing up in Caroline County:  “There’s a few 
white, there’s a few colored and we all, as we grew up and as they grew up, we all helped one 
another . . . .  It was all mixed together, you know, to start with, so we just kept going that 
way.” Id. 
 34. Brief for Appellants, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 
113927, at *6–7. 
 35. Id. at *7. 
 36. Id. at *6–7; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1950) (repealed 1968) (“If any white 
person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with 
the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, 
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished . . . and the marriage shall be governed by 
the same law as if it has been solemnized in this State.”). 
 37. Brief for Appellants, supra note 34, at *7. 
 38. Id. 
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.39  
The Lovings’ case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where oral 
arguments were conducted on April 10, 1967.40  R.D. McIlwaine III, an 
Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, presented 
Virginia’s case.41  The state’s core argument was that the antimiscegenation 
statute in question did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
applied equally to blacks and whites.42  Further, the state argued that the 
Court should uphold the antimiscegenation statute because it served a 
legitimate state interest in protecting the institution of marriage.43 
Assistant Attorney General McIlwaine’s discussion of why the prevention 
of interracial marriages was a “legitimate exercise of the state power”44 shed 
light on the state’s desire to prevent the dilution of the white race.  The 
discussion of the state’s purpose began with a sly focus on the challenges that 
faced children born of interracial marriages.45  While acknowledging that 
there was scientific evidence “on both sides,” Mr. McIlwaine stated:  “It is 
clear from the most recent available evidence on the psycho-sociological 
aspect of this question that intermarried families are subjected to much 
greater pressures and problems [than] those of the intramarried . . . .”46  
Relying on a dubious “study,”47 McIlwaine then proceeded to place the 
state’s interest in prohibiting interracial marriage on equal footing with the 
state’s prohibition of polygamous marriage, incestuous marriage, and 
marriage between incompetent parents.48  He argued that children born of 
interracial marriages “have almost insuperable difficulties in identification 
and that the problems which a child of an interracial marriage faces are those 
which no child can come through without damage to himself.”49  McIlwaine 
derided the parents of children born to interracial unions and stated that 
“interracial marriages bequeath to the progeny of those marriages, more 
psychological problems than parents have a right to bequeath to them.”50  He 
then referred to the children of interracial marriages as “victims.”51  
McIlwaine conceded that the problems faced by children of interracial 
 
 39. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 40. See generally Oral Argument, supra note 5. 
 41. Id. at 00:51:28–2:03:37. 
 42. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1967); see also Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 
1:00:05–:00:42. 
 43. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8; see also Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:00:44–:01:12. 
 44. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:19:08–:19:11. 
 45. Id. at 1:19:58–:27:19. 
 46. Id. at 1:19:34–:21:07. 
 47. McIlwaine principally relied upon a book written by Dr. Albert Isaac Gordon, which 
McIlwaine said “is characterized as the definitive book on intermarriage, and has the most 
careful, up to date, methodologically sound study of intermarriage in North America that 
exists.” Id. at 1:22:08–:22:24.  See generally ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE:  
INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC (1964) (containing information that served as the 
bases for Virginia’s arguments in Loving). 
 48. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:20:51–:21:26. 
 49. Id. at 1:26:19–:26:40. 
 50. Id. at 1:23:43–:23:51. 
 51. Id. at 1:27:03–:27:17. 
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marriage were likely due to racism.52  Ultimately, McIlwaine was forced to 
acknowledge the primary reason antimiscegenation laws were enacted—to 
advance the cause of white supremacy.53 
IV.  BIAS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY 
Vestiges of the white supremacist ideology at the center of Loving appear 
in our current child welfare system, which has long been plagued by 
disproportionate representation of black families in its charge.54  For nearly 
two decades, studies have indicated that black children are overrepresented 
in the child welfare system.55  Black children are referred to child protective 
authorities, investigated by child protective workers, and placed in foster care 
at much higher rates than are white children.56  This pattern of 
disproportionate representation has persisted despite efforts by federal, state, 
and local government programs to address disproportionality.57 
Bias58 and poverty59 may influence such disproportionality.  Both of these 
factors can be traced back to the broader legacy of legalized racism and 
segregation that underpinned antimiscegenation laws.60  Studies on the role 
of bias in perpetuating disproportionality conjure up the arguments raised by 
Assistant Attorney General McIlwaine in Loving:  that black parents—and 
by extension, the white parents who create families with them—are 
inherently incompetent.61  For example, a recent report on disproportionality 
cites two studies in Texas that found “that race, risk, and income all influence 
case decision, but even though black families tended to be assessed with 
lower risk scores than White families, they were more likely than White 
families to have substantiated cases, have their children removed, or be 
 
 52. Id. at 1:26:19–:26:40. 
 53. Id. at 1:34:47–:35:33. 
 54. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2; DOROTHY ROBERTS, 
SHATTERED BONDS:  THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 6 (2002); Jessica Dixon, The African-
American Child Welfare Act:  A Legal Redress for African-American Disproportionality in 
Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 109 (2008). 
 55. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2–5. 
 56. Id. at 3–4. 
 57. See Chapin Hall Ctr. for Children at the Univ. of Chi., Understanding Racial and 
Ethnic Disparity in Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY AND 
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE:  A COMPENDIUM 9, 20 
(2009), https://jeffreybutts.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/cjjr_ch_final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4GFL-2S3N]. 
 58. See ROBERTS, supra note 54, at 95 (“We should not ignore, though, the considerable 
evidence that race and not poverty alone affects decision making at every step of the child 
protection process.  Racism in reporting illustrates how racial bias combines with broader 
inequities to push disparate numbers of Black children into the system.”); see also John Fluke 
et al., Research Synthesis on Child Welfare Disproportionality and Disparities, in DISPARITIES 




 59. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 6. 
 60. Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 
602–03 (2014). 
 61. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:23:17–:24:02. 
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provided family-based safety services.”62  One of the Texas studies was 
particularly compelling.  Researchers controlled for multiple variables that 
might contribute to disproportionate representation of black children 
throughout the child welfare system, including, but not limited to, risk 
assessment scores, type of allegation, source of report, and sociodemographic 
variables, such as marital status and income.63  Their findings revealed that, 
all other things being equal, racial bias was present from the child welfare 
system’s very first encounter with a family.64 
Research also indicates that racial bias is even more pronounced during 
parenting-behavior assessments when such assessments are conducted by 
social workers of a different race than the parent.65  Scholars Lawrence 
Berger, Marla McDaniel, and Christina Paxson highlight the “systematic 
differences” between black and white interviewers and how those 
interviewers will assess parenting behaviors and characteristics of black 
families.66  For example, when assessed by white observers, black mothers 
are more likely to be seen as having a “lack of maternal verbal and social 
skills,” being “harsh,” or lacking “warmth” when dealing with their 
children’s problem behaviors.67  The study also found, however, that black 
mothers are not perceived this way when assessed by a black observer.68  
When an observer has incomplete information about a parent, there is 
evidence that the observer will use race as a “proxy” for poverty, which may 
lead the observer to “attribute poor [parenting skills] to all blacks, regardless 
of their socioeconomic status.”69 
V.  FRONT-END BIAS AND THE LESSONS OF LOVING 
An exploding body of research on the nature of bias has shed new light on 
twenty-first-century discrimination.70  Unlike the blatant racism that was 
 
 62. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 6 (citing Alan J. Dettlaff et al., 
Disentangling Substantiation:  The Influence of Race, Income, and Risk on the Substantiation 
Decision in Child Welfare, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1630, 1630–37 (2011); 
Stephanie L. Rivaux et al., The Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Risk:  Understanding the 
Decision to Provide Services to Clients and to Remove Children, 87 CHILD WELFARE 151, 153 
(2008)). 
 63. Rivaux et al., supra note 62, at 161. 
 64. See id. (“Race did contribute to the decision to take action on a case; specifically, 
when compared to Anglo Americans, African Americans were 20% more likely to have their 
case acted upon.  Our theoretical variables, risk and income, were also significant 
predictors. . . .  [A]ll else equal, when actions are taken, Anglo Americans would be more 
likely to be assigned to [Family Based Safety Services] while African Americans would be 
more likely to be removed.”). 
 65. See generally Lawrence M. Berger, Marla McDaniel & Christina Paxson, Assessing 
Parenting Behaviors Across Racial Groups:  Implications for the Child Welfare System, 79 
SOC. SERV. REV. 653 (2005) (finding pronounced evidence of racial bias in the assessment of 
black parenting behaviors when conducted by white interviewers). 
 66. Id. at 677. 
 67. Id. at 674–75. 
 68. Id. at 674. 
 69. Id. at 677. 
 70. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1124 (2012) (discussing explicit, implicit, and structural forms of bias and their effects on and 
within the justice system). 
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present during the 1950s when the Lovings were married, researchers have 
documented the pervasiveness of implicit and unintentional bias—“attitudes 
or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decisionmaking, and behavior, 
without our even realizing it.”71  The persistence of disproportionality in the 
child welfare system raises the question of whether implicit bias is at play.72  
Most of the literature on disproportionality focuses primarily on the extent to 
which children of color are removed from their homes, placed in foster care, 
and remain in the child welfare system.73  More recently, commentators have 
begun to investigate the role of bias in decision-making at the front end of 
the system, when claims of child abuse and neglect are initially received and 
investigated by child welfare authorities.74  These decisions are critical 
because they set the stage for removal of children from their homes and 
placement in foster care. 
The first decision point in the child welfare journey happens when a parent 
is reported for suspected abuse or neglect.75  Depending on the state, reports 
of child abuse and neglect are made via telephone or electronically by child 
protective agencies or law enforcement agencies.76  These initial reports are 
then screened by agency personnel who decide whether the claims meet state 
law criteria.77  If the report is deemed valid, it is sent to the local child 
protective agency and investigated.78  These investigations open the door for 
possible removal and placement in foster care.79  Thus, bias at the front end 
of the system provides the gateway to disproportionality.80 
Two factors at the front end can lay the groundwork for how implicit bias 
might occur.  Nationwide, most reports involve claims of child neglect.81  
There is already a significant body of scholarship on how the overbroad legal 
definitions of child abuse and neglect invite decision makers to supplant the 
values of families charged with neglect.82  State definitions of child neglect 
are particularly troublesome because they point to conditions of poverty, such 
as inadequate food, clothing, or shelter.83  The presence of these seemingly 
innocuous measures in evaluating parents’ capabilities belies the history of 
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ideological racism inherent within the child welfare system, which is rooted 
in legal theories that, historically and intentionally, reinforced the institution 
of slavery84 and the inadequacy of black mothers.85  Thus, evaluating 
whether parents have provided “adequate” care is inherently fraught.  Such 
evaluations can easily invite a muted version of the kind of bias that 
permeated the antimiscegenation laws at issue in Loving. 
Another front-end factor worth considering is the ubiquitous system of 
mandatory reporting laws that support the child welfare system.86  All fifty 
states “have statutes identifying persons who are required to report suspected 
child [abuse and neglect] to an appropriate agency.”87  These mandatory 
reporting statutes have built-in incentives that encourage reporters to take 
action, even in close cases.88  Definitions of neglect and mandatory reporting 
laws are designed to support the child welfare system in protecting children 
from harm.89  But what if the faulty definition of “child neglect,” combined 
with mandatory reporting laws, create the groundwork for implicit racial 
stereotypes to emerge?90 
A manual developed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services’s Office on Child Abuse and Neglect provides a powerful example 
of how evaluating whether a parent has neglected her child can invite implicit 
bias.91  The manual defines environmental neglect as being “characterized by 
a lack of environmental or neighborhood safety, opportunities, or 
resources.”92  In addition, the manual encourages case workers to focus most 
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attention on the “conditions in the home,” “parental omissions,” and “impact 
of dangerous neighborhoods,” and to look for signs of risk factors such as 
“poverty, community and society characteristics.”93  Consequently, when 
caseworkers use federal guidelines such as these to assess a parent accused 
of neglect, their expectations are effectively “primed.”94  If a worker has 
recently observed or read about parenting behavior that often leads to a 
finding of “neglect,” the worker may interpret a subsequent parent’s 
behaviors in a way that is consistent with their expectations for finding 
neglect.95  Additionally, when examples of “good parenting” are created by 
the social expectations of a white-majority middle-class culture, observers 
are significantly more likely to evaluate a particular situation under a lens 
that favors families who exemplify these expectations.96  In effect, mandatory 
reporters and other front-line decision makers called to identify and evaluate 
black families suspected of child neglect are primed by these faulty standards 
to summon the ghosts of antimiscegenation laws. 
The limited data on the experiences of interracial families in the child 
welfare system paint an eerie path back to Loving’s troubling legacy.  One 
study has shown that biracial children in the child welfare system fare worse 
than black children.97  They were more likely to be referred for investigations 
and considered high risk than white or African American children.98  
Moreover, parents of biracial children “were more often assessed as having 
physical, intellectual or emotional problems.”99  More data are required to 
illuminate whether bias is implicated for biracial children in the child welfare 
system, but the data reported100 in this recent study are troubling, to say the 
least. 
CONCLUSION 
The legacy of Loving is far reaching.  Richard and Mildred Loving will 
always be celebrated for the courage they exhibited and the path they created 
toward marriage equality.101  On the flip side, the legacy of white supremacy 
disguised as child protection deserves to be interrogated.  The pervasiveness 
of disproportionality in the modern child welfare system provides fodder for 
exploring Loving’s reach. 
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